securedrop-proxy origin limitation can be bypassed with redirects
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.3.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
SecureDrop Client is a desktop app for journalists to securely communicate with sources and handle submissions on the SecureDrop Workstation. Prior to version 1.3.1, a malicious SecureDrop Server could bypass securedrop-proxy's origin limitation by responding with cross-origin redirects. SecureDrop Server itself has multiple layers of built-in hardening, and is a dedicated physical machine exposed on the internet only via Tor hidden services for the Source and Journalist interfaces, and optionally via remote SSH access over another Tor hidden service. A newsroom's SecureDrop Workstation communicates only with its own dedicated SecureDrop Server. Version 1.3.1 fixes the issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- freedomofpress securedrop-client
fixed in 1.3.1