RIOT: DHCPv6 client _parse_reply() missing sub-option length check leads to size_t underflow and unbounded OOB heap read
- Published
- Last modified
- Status
- published
- Known exploitation
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2026.07
- Public exploit
- None on Exploit-DB
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
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Decision points from CISA's Vulnrichment, assessed (SSVC 2.0.3).
SSVC documentationSummary
RIOT is an open-source microcontroller operating system designed for Internet of Things devices and other embedded systems. Prior to 2026.07, _parse_reply() in sys/net/application_layer/dhcpv6/client.c omits minimum-length validation before passing IA_PD and IA_NA option bodies to sub-option parsers. A malicious or compromised DHCPv6 server can send a REPLY with an option length smaller than the required structure while MODULE_DHCPV6_CLIENT_IA_PD is enabled, causing _parse_ia_pd_option to read past the option body, size_t underflow, and unbounded out-of-bounds heap reads that can crash the device and may expose or corrupt memory. This issue is fixed in version 2026.07.
Affected versions
- RIOT-OS RIOT
fixed in 2026.07