Cosmos: Authentication bypass via forward-auth header smuggling on Constellation tunnel in Cosmos-Server
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.22.19
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Cosmos provides users the ability self-host a home server by acting as a secure gateway to your application, as well as a server manager. Prior to 0.22.19, tokenMiddleware in src/proxy/routerGen.go can return through the Constellation tunnel bypass before removing x-cosmos-user, x-cosmos-role, x-cosmos-user-role, and x-cosmos-mfa headers and before invoking AdminOnlyWithRedirect. An attacker with a valid x-cstln-auth API key for an enrolled device who reaches Cosmos through the Constellation Nebula tunnel can supply a chosen x-cosmos-user value to a route with AuthEnabled enabled when the upstream application trusts that forward-auth header. The request can bypass Cosmos JWT, password, MFA, and AdminOnly checks, allowing user impersonation and admin-tier reads or writes exposed by the proxied application. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.19.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- azukaar Cosmos-Server
fixed in 0.22.19
- github.com/azukaar/cosmos-serverGo
fixed in 0.22.19