Symfony UX: CSRF Protection Bypass in symfony/ux-live-component — Accept Header is CORS-Safelisted
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.1.0, 2.36.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Symfony UX is a JavaScript ecosystem for Symfony. From 2.22.0 until 2.36.0 and 3.1.0, Symfony\UX\LiveComponent\EventListener\LiveComponentSubscriber::isLiveComponentRequest() gates #[LiveAction] invocations on Accept: application/vnd.live-component+html, but the Accept header is CORS-safelisted and cross-origin fetch() can set it without preflight, allowing forged cross-origin #[LiveAction] requests against a victim session when applications use SameSite=None, credentials: 'include', a permissive cookie policy, or a same-origin pivot. This issue is fixed in versions 2.36.0 and 3.1.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- symfony ux
From 3.0.0 · fixed in 3.1.0; From 2.22.0 · fixed in 2.36.0
- symfony/ux-live-componentPackagist
From 2.22.0 · fixed in 2.36.0
- symfony/ux-live-componentPackagist
From 3.0.0 · fixed in 3.1.0