Jellyfin: Potential FFmpeg argument injection via unescaped subtitle file path
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 10.11.10
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Jellyfin is an open source self hosted media server. Prior to 10.11.10, a potential FFmpeg argument injection vulnerability exists in the subtitle conversion code path. SubtitleEncoder.ConvertTextSubtitleToSrtInternal (SubtitleEncoder.cs, line 382) interpolates the subtitle file path into FFmpeg command-line arguments without calling EncodingUtils.NormalizePath(). On Linux, filenames can contain double-quote characters, which break the argument quoting and allow injection of arbitrary FFmpeg arguments. The vulnerability is reachable without authentication via SubtitleController.GetSubtitle, which has no [Authorize] attribute. An attacker who can place a file in a Jellyfin media library directory (shared NAS, Samba share, guest upload) can achieve arbitrary file write on the server and information disclosure. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.11.10.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- jellyfin jellyfin
fixed in 10.11.10