Saleor: Anonymous users can modify channel settings via `channelUpdate` due to `all([])` bypass in permission check
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.21.67, 3.22.63, 3.23.22
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Saleor is an e-commerce platform. From 3.14.67 until 3.21.67, 3.22.63, and 3.23.22, a broken authorization check in saleor/permission/utils.py can incorrectly authorize unauthenticated GraphQL requests. The flaw permits anonymous callers to use the channelUpdate() mutation to change channel order settings such as allowUnpaidOrders even when the response reports PermissionDenied. The same permission utility can expose hidden objects through the pageType() and translation() queries, including attributes whose visibleInStorefront field is false and that should be visible only to users with management permissions. This issue is fixed in versions 3.21.67, 3.22.63, and 3.23.22.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- saleor saleor
From 3.14.67 · fixed in 3.21.67; From 3.22.0-a.0 · fixed in 3.22.63; From 3.23.0-a.0 · fixed in 3.23.22