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CVE-2026-48737PYSEC-2026-2995GHSA-M5X5-28JR-GPJJ

pyLoad: SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 6to4/NAT64 transition wrappers of internal IPs

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev101
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
  • Exploitation: poc
  • Automatable: no
  • Technical impact: partial

Summary

pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev101, is_global_address in src/pyload/core/utils/web/check.py relies on Python's global-address classification without examining IPv4 destinations embedded in 6to4 or NAT64 IPv6 addresses. A low-privileged user can submit an IPv6 literal through parse_urls to the pre-resolution is_global_host guard. Because host_to_ip is pinned to AF_INET, that guard does not evaluate a hostname's AAAA result. Separately, curl resolves hostnames before the pycurl PREREQFUNC in src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py applies the same vulnerable is_global_address check to the actual connection address, so a transition-form AAAA result can be permitted even when it terminates at an embedded loopback, private, CGNAT, or link-local IPv4 address. Exploitation requires the pyLoad host to route the applicable transition mechanism, including 6to4 on affected Python 3.9 through 3.11 deployments or NAT64 on a network with a NAT64 gateway. Successful exploitation can enable internal-network reconnaissance, timing-based confirmation, limited service disruption, or cloud metadata disclosure where the wrapped address is routable. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0b3.dev101.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. CISA SSVC assessment

    Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial

  3. Record last updated

Affected versions

  • pyload pyload

    fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev101

  • pyload-ngPyPI

    through 0.5.0b3.dev100

References 2

GitHub · pyload/pyload