Nextflow: Incorrect default permissions in the nextflow auth login command
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 25.10.6, 26.04.3
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Nextflow is a DSL for data-driven computational pipelines. From 25.09.2-edge until 25.10.6 and 26.04.3, nextflow auth login writes Seqera Platform OIDC bearer tokens to ${NXF_HOME:-~/.nextflow}/seqera-auth.config through AuthCommandImpl.writeConfig in plugins/nf-tower/src/main/io/seqera/tower/plugin/auth/AuthCommandImpl.groovy without setting restrictive file permissions, allowing the default umask 022 to create the file with mode 0644. On a multi-user POSIX host, a local user who can traverse the victim's home directory can read seqera-auth.config and impersonate the victim against Seqera Platform within the token's scope. Single-user systems and headless CI runners that do not use the interactive login flow are not affected. This issue is fixed in 25.10.6 and 26.04.3.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- nextflow-io nextflow
From 25.09.2-edge · fixed in 25.10.6; From 25.11.0-edge · fixed in 26.04.3
- io.nextflow:nextflowMaven
From 25.09.2-edge · fixed in 25.10.6
- io.nextflow:nextflowMaven
From 26.00.0-edge · fixed in 26.04.3