Russh: SSH identification parsing accepted non-canonical client banners and did not bound pre-banner input
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.61.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Russh is a Rust SSH client & server library. From version 0.34.0-beta.1 to before version 0.61.0, russh did not enforce the SSH identification-string rules as deliberately as OpenSSH. In particular, the server-side identification reader used the same permissive path as the client, allowing pre-banner lines from clients, and the reader did not enforce a bounded number of pre-banner lines. For a library server built on russh, this could allow a remote peer to hold connection setup resources in the cleartext pre-authentication phase with malformed identification input that should have been rejected early. This issue has been patched in version 0.61.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Eugeny russh
From 0.34.0-beta.1 · fixed in 0.61.0
- russhcrates.io
From 0.34.0-beta.1 · fixed in 0.61.0