crun follows rootfs /dev symlink while creating default devices
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.28
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
crun is an open source OCI Container Runtime fully written in C. Prior to version 1.28, crun's default device setup opens the container rootfs `/dev` directory without `O_NOFOLLOW`. If an OCI bundle contains `rootfs/dev` as a symlink and the bundle configuration does not mount `/dev`, crun follows that symlink and creates the default device nodes and stdio symlinks at the symlink target outside the container rootfs. In a local rootful crun replay, this created fixed device nodes and symlinks outside the rootfs before crun returned failure. A pre-existing file named `ptmx` in the target directory was also replaced by crun's forced `ptmx -> pts/ptmx` symlink. Version 1.28 fixes the issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- containers crun
fixed in 1.28