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CVE-2026-47691GHSA-5PVG-856G-CP85

Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 4.2.15.Final, 4.1.135.Final
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
  • Exploitation: none
  • Automatable: no
  • Technical impact: total

Summary

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record's name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain's key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain's key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Timeline

  1. CISA SSVC assessment

    Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total

  2. CVE published
  3. Record last updated

Affected versions

  • netty netty

    From 4.2.0.Final · fixed in 4.2.15.Final; fixed in 4.1.135.Final

  • io.netty:netty-resolver-dnsMaven

    From 4.2.0.Final · fixed in 4.2.15.Final

  • io.netty:netty-resolver-dnsMaven

    fixed in 4.1.135.Final

References 3

GitHub · netty/netty