praisonai-platform: Agent endpoints accept any agent_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.1.4
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an* Insecure Direct Object Reference. The agent CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `agent_id` through `AgentService.get(agent_id)` which is a primary-key lookup with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, or delete agents that belong to a different workspace `W2` by guessing or harvesting an agent UUID and calling `…/workspaces/W1/agents/<W2-agent-id>`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- MervinPraison praisonai-platform
fixed in 0.1.4
- praisonai-platformPyPI
fixed in 0.1.4