In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, the exported launcher activity AppActivity accepts an attacker-supplied
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 5.9.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, the exported launcher activity AppActivity accepts an attacker-supplied session (including OAuth tokens) from Intent extras with no permission guard, and signs the app into that session without validating it against the backend. This requires a malicious application co-installed on a device with the Datadog app installed, and an OAuth token the attacker is willing to load into the victim's app. Impact: A co-installed application can switch the victim's Datadog app to a session the attacker controls. This is an account-confusion issue; it does not by itself expose the victim's existing session or data.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Datadog Android App
From 5.9.2 · fixed in 5.9.2