Runtipi: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read through app-store logo symlinks
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.10.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Runtipi is a personal homeserver orchestrator. In versions 4.9.1 through 4.9.3, Runtipi serves marketplace app logos from files inside cloned app-store repositories through an unauthenticated endpoint, which leads to arbitrary file read through app-store logo symlinks. The path guard checks only the lexical path before Node reads the file, so a Git app store that contains metadata/logo.jpg as a symbolic link can cause Runtipi to read and return the symlink target. Because the endpoint is public and the symlink target may point outside the cloned repository, this can expose local files from the Runtipi container such as /data/.env, /data/state/seed, logs, or application files. This can disclose JWT secrets, service credentials, local configuration, and operational logs depending on the instance. The issue has been fixed in version 4.10.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- runtipi runtipi
From 4.9.1 · fixed in 4.10.0