Ghostfolio has a Stripe subscription bypass
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.4.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Ghostfolio is an open source wealth management software. Prior to version 3.4.0, Ghostfolio's Stripe checkout success-URL handler at `GET /api/v1/subscription/stripe/callback?checkoutSessionId=<id>` retrieves the Stripe Checkout Session by ID and unconditionally grants a Premium subscription to the session's `client_reference_id` — without ever checking `session.payment_status` or `session.status`. There is no separate Stripe webhook endpoint with `stripe-signature` verification; this callback is the sole code path that creates Stripe-driven subscriptions. Any authenticated user can self-grant a 1-year Premium subscription without ever paying. Version 3.4.0 rejects sessions unless `session.payment_status === 'paid'` AND `session.status === 'complete'` (fails closed). Additionally, new unique `stripeCheckoutSessionId` column → a session can't be redeemed twice (race-safe via DB unique constraint).
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- ghostfolio ghostfolio
fixed in 3.4.0