CRLF injection in cookie domain/path options in hackney
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.0.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Response Splitting. The hackney_cookie:setcookie/3 function in src/hackney_cookie.erl validates the Name and Value arguments against CRLF and control characters, but concatenates the domain and path options verbatim into the output iolist with no equivalent check. An attacker who controls either option — for example by supplying a Host header value forwarded as the cookie domain, or a request path forwarded as the cookie path — can inject a literal CRLF sequence and arbitrary additional Set-Cookie headers into the HTTP response. This issue affects hackney: from 0.9.0 before 4.0.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- hackney
From 0.9.0 · fixed in 4.0.1
- benoitc/hackney
Version range not reported