Skip to main content
← All vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-47065GHSA-V3PR-HXPR-MFM8

Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass - ZDRES-232

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 2.2.8, 2.1.13, 2.0.29
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
  • Exploitation: none
  • Automatable: yes
  • Technical impact: total

Summary

ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.

Timeline

  1. CISA SSVC assessment

    Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total

  2. CVE published
  3. Record last updated

Affected versions

  • org.apache.mina:mina-core

    From 2.2.0 · fixed in 2.2.8; From 2.1.0 · fixed in 2.1.13; From 2.0.0 · fixed in 2.0.29

  • org.apache.mina:mina-coreMaven

    From 2.2.0 · fixed in 2.2.8

  • org.apache.mina:mina-coreMaven

    From 2.1.0 · fixed in 2.1.13

  • org.apache.mina:mina-coreMaven

    fixed in 2.0.29

References 1

lists.apache.org