OpenAM Account Takeover via Unverified Password Change in OAuth2 Module
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 16.1.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Open Access Management (OpenAM) is an access management solution. Prior to 16.1.1, the OAuth2 authentication module updates an existing local account with profile attributes that can include userPassword and inetUserStatus, rewriting the password to the username and reactivating disabled accounts. The missing OAuth.removeRestrictedAccountUpdateAttributes filtering permits these credential and status fields to reach the account update. With account creation enabled, repeated OAuth login causes the default ldapService chain to accept the username as both identifier and password, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to take over the local account without interacting with the identity provider. The rewrite can be denied for usernames shorter than the configured minimum password length. This issue is fixed in version 16.1.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OpenIdentityPlatform OpenAM
fixed in 16.1.1
- org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-auth-oauth2Maven
fixed in 16.1.1