NocoDB: Shared-base link access can invite arbitrary users as persistent base members
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2026.04.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- 1 proof of concept on GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, shared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (xc-shared-base-id), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link. Shared-base sessions were mapped to ProjectRoles.VIEWER in packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts, and packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts granted baseUserList and userInvite to that role. The shared frontend (packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- nocodb nocodb
fixed in 2026.04.1
- nocodbnpm
through 0.301.3