luci-app-https-dns-proxy Authenticated Command Injection via setInitAction
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- 1 on Exploit-DB, 1 proof of concept on GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
luci-app-https-dns-proxy through 2025.12.29-5 — an optional LuCI web UI add-on for the https-dns-proxy package, distributed through the OpenWrt community packages feed and not installed by default — contains a command injection vulnerability in the setInitAction function. An authenticated user holding the luci.https-dns-proxy ACL permission can inject shell metacharacters through the 'name' parameter of a ubus RPC call to luci.https-dns-proxy setInitAction, resulting in arbitrary command execution as root on the underlying device. Core OpenWrt is not affected; only installations that have opted in to the luci-app-https-dns-proxy package are vulnerable.
Timeline
- Public exploit on Exploit-DB
EDB-52521
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- mossdef-org luci-app-https-dns-proxy
through 2025.12.29-5