net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 5.10.258, 5.15.209, 6.1.175, 6.6.140, 6.12.88, and 2 more
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack without initialisation: struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast; The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field: /* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */ struct ifla_vf_broadcast { __u8 broadcast[32]; }; The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len as the length: memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len); On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs) dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via: nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast) leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable. The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi, vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above. vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added. Reachability: any unprivileged local process can open AF_NETLINK / NETLINK_ROUTE without capabilities and send RTM_GETLINK with an IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute carrying RTEXT_FILTER_VF. The kernel walks each VF and emits IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, leaking 26 bytes of stack per VF per request. Stack residue at this call site can include return addresses and transient sensitive data; KASAN with stack instrumentation, or KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced. Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same function.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From 75345f888f700c4ab2448287e35d48c760b202e6 · fixed in 14271b401ec6a4bf0d88054106fc2956084717e1; From 75345f888f700c4ab2448287e35d48c760b202e6 · fixed in cccce3190ba4356432b9f22369b56123d3d89f0d; From 75345f888f700c4ab2448287e35d48c760b202e6 · fixed in a44fbb631cba646532f3948636626f81717365a7; From 75345f888f700c4ab2448287e35d48c760b202e6 · fixed in 0653c0516234c8258975d268a749115fc0f0ff00; From 75345f888f700c4ab2448287e35d48c760b202e6 · fixed in c5b1b92ab7eff1a6e8c507ddde6fd02fabd0cfa8; From 75345f888f700c4ab2448287e35d48c760b202e6 · fixed in fbe0e6197225e6a83cf113a67a4b425f8de0bcd5; From 75345f888f700c4ab2448287e35d48c760b202e6 · fixed in 38bcc21f52246badb3154b6158dcb381d98de011; From 75345f888f700c4ab2448287e35d48c760b202e6 · fixed in 4b9e327991815e128ad3af75c3a04630a63ce3e0
- Linux Linux
5.3
- KernelLinux
From 5.3.0 · fixed in 5.10.258; From 5.11.0 · fixed in 5.15.209; From 5.16.0 · fixed in 6.1.175; From 6.2.0 · fixed in 6.6.140; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.88; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.30; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.0.7
References 8
git.kernel.org
- stable/c/14271b401ec6a4bf0d88054106fc2956084717e1
- stable/c/cccce3190ba4356432b9f22369b56123d3d89f0d
- stable/c/a44fbb631cba646532f3948636626f81717365a7
- stable/c/0653c0516234c8258975d268a749115fc0f0ff00
- stable/c/c5b1b92ab7eff1a6e8c507ddde6fd02fabd0cfa8
- stable/c/fbe0e6197225e6a83cf113a67a4b425f8de0bcd5
- stable/c/38bcc21f52246badb3154b6158dcb381d98de011
- stable/c/4b9e327991815e128ad3af75c3a04630a63ce3e0