Omni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.6.6, 1.7.3
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Omni manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud. From 1.3.0 until 1.6.6 and 1.7.3, importing a standalone Talos cluster creates an ImportedClusterSecrets resource containing the cluster's complete CA secrets bundle. The access rules in internal/backend/runtime/omni/state_access.go allow an authenticated user with the Reader role to retrieve the resource through ResourceService if the importing actor has not rotated those secrets, exposing Kubernetes, Talos, and etcd CA private keys plus the service-account key. The Kubernetes CA private key permits certificate signing for privileged identities such as system:masters and provides control of the imported cluster outside Omni's authorization boundary, including its workloads, credentials, and secrets. This issue is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.3.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- siderolabs omni
From 1.3.0 · fixed in 1.6.6
- github.com/siderolabs/omniGo
From 1.3.0 · fixed in 1.6.6
- github.com/siderolabs/omniGo
From 1.7.0 · fixed in 1.7.3
- github.com/siderolabs/omniGo
From 1.3.0 · fixed in 1.6.6; From 1.7.0 · fixed in 1.7.3