Omni: Operator can traverse image-factory API paths via unsanitized `talos_version` in CreateSchematic
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.6.6, 1.7.3
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Omni manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud. Prior to 1.6.6 and 1.7.3, managementServer.CreateSchematic in internal/backend/grpc/schematics.go passes the caller-controlled TalosVersion field to imageFactoryClient.OverlaysVersions without validating it as a version. An authenticated Operator can submit traversal segments in TalosVersion, and url.URL.JoinPath normalizes them into unintended paths on the configured image-factory host. Omni then issues HTTP GET requests to those paths and reflects error-body content, enabling same-host endpoint probing and possible disclosure of internal diagnostics while preventing redirection to another host or write requests. This issue is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.3.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- siderolabs omni
fixed in 1.6.6; From 1.7.0 · fixed in 1.7.3
- github.com/siderolabs/omniGo
fixed in 1.6.6; From 1.7.0 · fixed in 1.7.3
- github.com/siderolabs/omniGo
fixed in 1.6.6
- github.com/siderolabs/omniGo
From 1.7.0 · fixed in 1.7.3