Omni: TOCTOU race condition allows multiple concurrent uses of a single-use SAML session token
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.6.6, 1.7.3
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Omni manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud. Prior to 1.6.6 and from 1.7.0 until 1.7.3, SAML.getSession in internal/pkg/auth/interceptor/saml.go checks SAMLAssertion.Used and marks it used in separate state operations. Concurrent requests carrying the same captured saml-session token can each observe the assertion as unused and obtain authentication as the victim before either update is visible. The attacker can invoke SAML-protected gRPC endpoints, use ConfirmPublicKey to create multiple persistent credentials tied to the victim, and generate audit entries attributed to the victim, with the resulting access potentially affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability according to the victim's privileges. This issue is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.3.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- siderolabs omni
fixed in 1.6.6; From 1.7.0 · fixed in 1.7.3
- github.com/siderolabs/omniGo
fixed in 1.6.6; From 1.7.0 · fixed in 1.7.3
- github.com/siderolabs/omniGo
fixed in 1.6.6
- github.com/siderolabs/omniGo
From 1.7.0 · fixed in 1.7.3