Mailpit has an incomplete fix for GHSA-6jxm: HTML check still permits SSRF to private/loopback/IMDS via missing IP-filter dialer

Summary

Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. The fix for GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j (CVE-2026-23845, "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check API"), shipped in mailpit `v1.28.3`, hardened `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::downloadCSSToBytes` with a 5MB size cap, a `text/css` content-type check, login-info stripping in `isValidURL`, and an opt-in `--block-remote-css-and-fonts` config flag — but did not add the IP-filtering dialer that the same codebase already uses on the two sister SSRF endpoints (the proxy handler and link-check). Prior to version 1.30.0, `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::newSafeHTTPClient` is mis-named — it builds an `http.Client` whose `Transport.DialContext` calls `net.Dialer.DialContext` directly with no IP allowlisting. As a result, the SSRF originally reported by Bao Anh Phan still permits the server to dial loopback, private, link-local, and any other reserved/multicast range, provided the target replies with `HTTP/200` and a content-type beginning with `text/css`. With redirect-following (`CheckRedirect` allows redirects to any `isValidURL` URL with no IP filter), an attacker-controlled public site can redirect mailpit's request into the private network without ever appearing in the email's HTML. In the default mailpit deploy (no UI auth, no SMTP auth, port 1025/8025 exposed), this is an unauthenticated, network-reachable SSRF triggered by sending an HTML email and then issuing one HTTP `GET` to `/api/v1/message/{id}/html-check`. Version 1.30.0 contains an updated fix.

Timeline

1. Jul 20, 2026, 2:37 PM UTCCVE published
2. Jul 20, 2026, 7:01 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial

3. Jul 20, 2026, 7:08 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• axllent mailpit

  From 1.28.3 · fixed in 1.30.0

• github.com/axllent/mailpitGo

  From 1.28.3 · fixed in 1.30.0

References 2