Rocket.Chat: Authenticated Arbitrary Data Export Theft via Mass Assignment in sendFileMessage
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, and 3 more
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat's sendFileMessage DDP method passes the entire attacker-supplied file object into Uploads.updateFileComplete, which merges it directly into a MongoDB $set update via Object.assign. There is no allow-list of writable fields. An attacker can therefore rewrite any column on their own upload record, notably store and the store-specific path fields. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- RocketChat Rocket.Chat
From 8.5.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.5.0; From 8.4.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.4.1; From 8.3.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.3.3; From 8.2.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.2.3; From 8.1.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.1.4; From 8.0.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.0.5; From 7.11.0-rc.0 · fixed in 7.13.7; fixed in 7.10.11