Decidim: Push subscriptions can be abused for server-side requests
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.30.9, 0.31.5, 0.32.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Decidim is a participatory democracy framework. Prior to 0.30.9, from 0.31.0 before 0.31.5, and in 0.32.0.rc1 before 0.32.0.rc2, when VAPID delivery is enabled, the notification subscription flow stores a client-supplied push endpoint without validating that it belongs to an approved push service, and SendPushNotification later passes that endpoint to WebPush.payload_send, allowing an authenticated user to create stored, mostly blind server-side requests to arbitrary reachable HTTPS endpoints. This issue is fixed in versions 0.30.9, 0.31.5, and 0.32.0.rc2.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- decidim decidim
fixed in 0.30.9; From 0.31.0.rc1 · fixed in 0.31.5; From 0.32.0.rc1 · fixed in 0.32.0
- decidim-coreRubyGems
fixed in 0.30.9
- decidim-coreRubyGems
From 0.31.0.rc1 · fixed in 0.31.5
- decidim-coreRubyGems
From 0.32.0.rc1 · fixed in 0.32.0