LiquidJS: Memory and render limit bypass via unbounded width padding in `date` filter (strftime)
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 10.26.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
LiquidJS is a Shopify/GitHub Pages compatible template engine written in pure JavaScript. In versions 10.25.7 and below, the date filter's strftime implementation parses width specifiers like %9999999d and forwards the captured width unchecked into pad()/padStart(), leading to memory and render limit bypass. In src/util/underscore.ts, the pad loop performs unbounded string concatenation without consulting the Context's memoryLimit or renderLimit, so a single small template ({{ x | date: '%5000000d' }}) produces megabytes of output and unbounded CPU. The memoryLimit and renderLimit options the docs (src/liquid-options.ts:87-92) advertise as DoS controls — and which the docstring explicitly mentions for strftime — are entirely bypassed. Exploitation can cause large memory allocations, high CPU usage, or OOM crashes per render. This issue has been fixed in version 10.26.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- harttle liquidjs
fixed in 10.26.0
- liquidjsnpm
fixed in 10.26.0