Budibase: SSRF via trivial `.tar.gz` substring bypass in Plugin URL upload (`/api/plugin`)
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.35.10
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.35.10, the Plugin URL upload endpoint (POST /api/plugin) validates the submitted URL with a single substring check: url.includes(".tar.gz"). Any URL containing .tar.gz anywhere in the string — in the path, query string, or fragment — passes this check. The URL then proceeds directly to fetchWithBlacklist() with no further validation of host, scheme, or path. Standalone, this vulnerability is blocked by Budibase's default SSRF blacklist, which covers private IP ranges. But the URL validation layer itself is broken regardless, and it directly enables SSRF in two realistic situations: (1) when chained with the BLACKLIST_IPS bypass ([001]), where the blacklist is empty; and (2) when the plugin server follows HTTP redirects from an external URL to an internal target (the default node-fetch behavior with redirect: 'follow'). This vulnerability is fixed in 3.35.10.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Budibase budibase
fixed in 3.35.10
- budibasenpm
fixed in 3.35.10