Mathesar: Missing collaborator checks allowed access to database-scoped Mathesar metadata
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.10.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Mathesar is a web application that makes working with PostgreSQL databases both simple and powerful. From 0.2.0 to before 0.10.0, collaborators.list, tables.metadata.list, explorations.list, and forms.list accept a database_id without verifying that the requesting user was a collaborator on that database. An authenticated user on the same Mathesar installation could use these methods to view Mathesar-managed metadata for databases where they were not a collaborator. Depending on the database and features in use, exposed metadata could include collaborator mappings, table metadata, saved exploration metadata, and form metadata. For forms, the exposed metadata included form tokens. For public forms, possession of the token is equivalent to possession of the public form link, which allows submission to the form under the form’s configured PostgreSQL role. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.10.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- mathesar-foundation mathesar
From 0.2.0 · fixed in 0.10.0