OpenEXR: Integer overflow in the HTJ2K decoder leads to heap-buffer-overflow
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.4.11
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions 3.4.0 through 3.4.11, an integer overflow in ht_undo_impl() in src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_ht.cpp leads to a heap-buffer overflow when decoding a crafted HTJ2K-compressed EXR file. decode->channels[i].width (int32_t) is multiplied by bytes_per_element in 32-bit signed arithmetic. With large widths (e.g., >= 536870912 for FLOAT data), this overflows, producing a corrupted offset that is later used for pointer arithmetic and can cause a heap out-of-bounds write. The same unchecked multiplication pattern appears in two other HTJ2K paths (bytes-per-line accumulation and pixel-line pointer advancement). As with related CVE-2026-34378 through CVE-2026-34589 fixes in other codecs, validating only after the multiplication is too late because the value may already be overflowed. This issue has been fixed in version 3.4.12.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- AcademySoftwareFoundation openexr
From 3.4.0 · fixed in 3.4.11