rxrpc: Also unshare DATA/RESPONSE packets when paged frags are present
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- 2 on Exploit-DB, 1 Metasploit module, 2 proofs of concept on GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Also unshare DATA/RESPONSE packets when paged frags are present The DATA-packet handler in rxrpc_input_call_event() and the RESPONSE handler in rxrpc_verify_response() copy the skb to a linear one before calling into the security ops only when skb_cloned() is true. An skb that is not cloned but still carries externally-owned paged fragments (e.g. SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG set by splice() into a UDP socket via __ip_append_data, or a chained skb_has_frag_list()) falls through to the in-place decryption path, which binds the frag pages directly into the AEAD/skcipher SGL via skb_to_sgvec(). Extend the gate to also unshare when skb_has_frag_list() or skb_has_shared_frag() is true. This catches the splice-loopback vector and other externally-shared frag sources while preserving the zero-copy fast path for skbs whose frags are kernel-private (e.g. NIC page_pool RX, GRO). The OOM/trace handling already in place is reused.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Public exploit on Exploit-DB
EDB-52585, EDB-52591
- Record last updated
- EPSS reached 10%
FIRST estimates at least a 10% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
Version range not reported
- Linux Linux
5.3