USB: core: Limit the length of unkillable synchronous timeouts
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: core: Limit the length of unkillable synchronous timeouts The usb_control_msg(), usb_bulk_msg(), and usb_interrupt_msg() APIs in usbcore allow unlimited timeout durations. And since they use uninterruptible waits, this leaves open the possibility of hanging a task for an indefinitely long time, with no way to kill it short of unplugging the target device. To prevent this sort of problem, enforce a maximum limit on the length of these unkillable timeouts. The limit chosen here, somewhat arbitrarily, is 60 seconds. On many systems (although not all) this is short enough to avoid triggering the kernel's hung-task detector. In addition, clear up the ambiguity of negative timeout values by treating them the same as 0, i.e., using the maximum allowed timeout.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
Version range not reported
- Linux Linux
2.6.12
References 8
git.kernel.org
- stable/c/4e86f5b79e62ded7e3c3ebd688cf5775e618148a
- stable/c/06d2bbc4c66c6b0e8a43728c4949026026a5be67
- stable/c/6c62935670acdbb7687ced20494923b66fbb0367
- stable/c/659c0c7d50a4b0f6aa197c4c098cfd91daf63862
- stable/c/24b31a227f679a942d820840a4dea7f0c09a387f
- stable/c/64f3d75633aedc12bdff220e9a4337177430bd9d
- stable/c/2d34cb4d1d6283b4be9c78f4a83ed6956d3069ec
- stable/c/1015c27a5e1a63efae2b18a9901494474b4d1dc3