ksmbd: fix signededness bug in smb_direct_prepare_negotiation()
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.6.160, 6.12.114, 6.18.16, 6.19.6
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix signededness bug in smb_direct_prepare_negotiation() smb_direct_prepare_negotiation() casts an unsigned __u32 value from sp->max_recv_size and req->preferred_send_size to a signed int before computing min_t(int, ...). A maliciously provided preferred_send_size of 0x80000000 will return as smaller than max_recv_size, and then be used to set the maximum allowed alowed receive size for the next message. By sending a second message with a large value (>1420 bytes) the attacker can then achieve a heap buffer overflow. This fix replaces min_t(int, ...) with min_t(u32)
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf · fixed in 56eab82fa6fb5ca024b0514e249d40d9b23ee5a7; From 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf · fixed in a110dbe928561d440e9e117d17331139a0bedace; From 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf · fixed in ceae058eb707ddd0d68f0872f9d9f23b7c30c37b; From 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf · fixed in 55abc475d096da4a5356b6efb0cfdc6156bc1550; From 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf · fixed in 6b4f875aac344cdd52a1f34cc70ed2f874a65757
- Linux Linux
5.15
- KernelLinux
From 5.15.0 · fixed in 6.6.160; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.114; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.16; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 6.19.6