ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count). This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from freed memory. In the syzbot report: • i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB) • Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes • A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds • This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry() Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from operating on invalid data.

Timeline

1. May 6, 2026, 7:40 AM UTCCVE published
2. Aug 5, 2026, 12:25 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• Linux Linux

  Version range not reported

• Linux Linux

  2.6.24

References 8