oxyno-zeta/s3-proxy: Security Issues in Resource Path Matching

Summary

oxyno-zeta/s3-proxy is an aws s3 proxy written in go. Prior to 5.0.0, s3-proxy contains an authentication bypass caused by inconsistent URL path interpretation between the authentication middleware and the bucket handler. The authentication middleware evaluates resource path patterns against the percent-encoded request URI (r.URL.RequestURI()), while the bucket handler constructs S3 object keys from the decoded path (r.URL.Path). This mismatch, combined with the glob library being invoked without a path separator (causing * to match across / boundaries), allows unauthenticated attackers to write to, read from, or delete objects in protected S3 namespaces. Exploitation is possible via three techniques: (1) using * patterns that match across path separators to reach protected routes via path traversal (e.g., /open/foo/drafts/../restricted/), (2) using percent-encoded slashes (%2F) to collapse multiple path segments into a single token at the auth layer while the decoded form resolves to a protected namespace at the storage layer, and (3) using dot-dot segments (../) under ** prefix patterns, where the raw path matches an open route while Go's URL parser resolves the traversal to a protected path before the bucket handler runs. An unauthenticated attacker with network access can perform unauthorized PUT, GET, or DELETE operations on objects in authentication-protected S3 namespaces. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.0.0.

Timeline

1. May 11, 2026, 7:26 PM UTCCVE published
2. May 13, 2026, 1:11 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total

3. May 13, 2026, 2:40 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• oxyno-zeta s3-proxy

  fixed in 5.0.0

• github.com/oxyno-zeta/s3-proxyGo

  fixed in 0.0.0-20260424211602-1320e4abd46a

References 3