Gotenberg: DNS rebinding bypasses SSRF validation on Chromium URL conversion routes
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 8.32.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, FilterOutboundURL resolves the hostname, checks the resolved IPs against the private-address deny-list, and returns only the error. It discards the resolved addresses. Chromium later performs its own DNS resolution when it navigates to the URL. An attacker who controls DNS for a hostname with a short TTL returns a public IP on the first query (Gotenberg allows) and a private IP on the second query (Chromium connects to the attacker-chosen internal address). The CDP Fetch.requestPaused handler re-checks the URL but runs its own DNS resolution, leaving a timing window before Chromium's actual TCP connect. The rendered internal service response returns to the caller as a PDF. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- gotenberg gotenberg
fixed in 8.32.0
- github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7Go
All versions
- github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8Go
All versions
- github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8Go
through 8.31.0