Netty: CRLF Injection in Netty Redis Codec Encoder
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.2.13.Final, 4.1.133.Final
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, the Netty Redis codec encoder (RedisEncoder) writes user-controlled string content directly to the network output buffer without validating or sanitizing CRLF (\r\n) characters. Since the Redis Serialization Protocol (RESP) uses CRLF as the command/response delimiter, an attacker who can control the content of a Redis message can inject arbitrary Redis commands or forge fake responses. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- netty netty
From 4.2.0.Alpha1 · fixed in 4.2.13.Final; fixed in 4.1.133.Final
- io.netty netty-codec-redis
From 4.2.0.Alpha1 · fixed in 4.2.13.Final; fixed in 4.1.133.Final
- io.netty:netty-codec-redisMaven
From 4.2.0.Alpha1 · fixed in 4.2.13.Final
- io.netty:netty-codec-redisMaven
fixed in 4.1.133.Final