apko doesn't verify downloaded apk packages against APKINDEX checksum (package substitution possible)
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.2.7
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7, apko verifies the signature on APKINDEX.tar.gz but never compares individually downloaded .apk packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via ChecksumString(), and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in getPackageImpl(). Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can substitute download responses (compromised mirror, HTTP repository, poisoned CDN cache) can install arbitrary packages into built images. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.7.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- chainguard-dev apko
fixed in 1.2.7
- chainguard.dev/apkoGo
fixed in 1.2.7