Unbounded HTTP response body read in OpenTelemetry.Resources.Azure
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.15.1-beta.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
OpenTelemetry.Resources.Azure is the .NET resource detector for Azure environments. In versions 1.15.0-beta.1 and earlier, the AzureVmMetaDataRequestor class makes HTTP requests to the Azure VM instance metadata service and reads the response body into memory without any size limit. An attacker who controls the configured endpoint, or who can intercept traffic to it via a man-in-the-middle attack, can return an arbitrarily large response body. This causes unbounded heap allocation in the consuming process, leading to high transient memory pressure, garbage-collection stalls, or an OutOfMemoryException that terminates the process. As a workaround, disable the Azure VM resource detector or use network-level controls such as firewall rules, mTLS, or a service mesh to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks on the Azure VM instance metadata endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 1.15.1-beta.1, which streams responses rather than buffering them entirely in memory and ignores responses larger than 4 MiB.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- open-telemetry opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib
through 1.15.0-beta.1
- OpenTelemetry.Resources.AzureNuGet
fixed in 1.15.1-beta.1