ServiceAccount token disclosure via install-cni container logs
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.31.6, 1.11.0-cni-plugin.0.20260417001138-cd73bc2cea0f
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
In Calico, the install-cni init container logs the rendered CNI configuration to standard output. When the configuration template uses the __SERVICEACCOUNT_TOKEN__ placeholder (Canal/Flannel-Calico deployments), the installer substitutes the live Kubernetes ServiceAccount bearer token before logging, exposing the token to any authenticated user with pods/log permission in the namespace with calico-node. The token holds patch privileges on pods/status, enabling annotation-based attacks against cluster workloads. The default kubeconfig-based authentication path is not affected. This is a direct regression of TTA-2018-001.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- cni-plugin
fixed in 3.31.6
- github.com/projectcalico/calicoGo
From 2.0.0 · fixed in 3.31.6
- github.com/projectcalico/calicoGo
fixed in 1.11.0-cni-plugin.0.20260417001138-cd73bc2cea0f
- github.com/projectcalico/calico/v3Go
All versions