AVideo has CORS Origin Reflection Bypass via plugin/API/router.php and allowOrigin(true) that Exposes Authenticated API Responses
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and below, the CORS origin validation fix in commit `986e64aad` is incomplete. Two separate code paths still reflect arbitrary `Origin` headers with credentials allowed for all `/api/*` endpoints: (1) `plugin/API/router.php` lines 4-8 unconditionally reflect any origin before application code runs, and (2) `allowOrigin(true)` called by `get.json.php` and `set.json.php` reflects any origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. An attacker can make cross-origin credentialed requests to any API endpoint and read authenticated responses containing user PII, email, admin status, and session-sensitive data. Commit 5e2b897ccac61eb6daca2dee4a6be3c4c2d93e13 contains a fix.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- WWBN AVideo
through 29.0
- wwbn/avideoPackagist
through 29.0