Local Blobstore may allow arbitrary reads/deletes
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 282.1.12
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
When the director sends a long-running request (e.g. compile_package), the agent's reply JSON is consumed by AgentClient. inject_compile_log (line 332-339) reads response['value']['result']['compile_log_id'] and format_exception (line 318-325) reads exception['blobstore_id']; both pass the agent-supplied string unmodified to download_and_delete_blob(blob_id) (line 344-349), which calls @resource_manager.get_resource(blob_id) and, in an ensure block, @resource_manager.delete_resource(blob_id). Api::ResourceManager forwards the id straight to blobstore.get(id) / blobstore.delete(id). When the director is configured with the local blobstore provider, Blobstore::LocalClient#object_file_path(oid) is File.join(@blobstore_path, oid) (local_client.rb:54-56) with no normalisation, so oid = "../../jobs/director/config/director.yml" resolves outside the blobstore root. Affected versions: BOSH Director: All versions prior to v282.1.12
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Cloud Foundry Foundation BOSH Director
fixed in 282.1.12