Apache OpenNLP: XXE via Dictionary Parsing in DictionaryEntryPersistor
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.5.9, 3.0.0-M3, 1.9.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
XML External Entity (XXE) via Unsanitized Dictionary Parsing in Apache OpenNLP DictionaryEntryPersistor Versions Affected: before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description: The DictionaryEntryPersistor class initializes a static SAXParserFactory at class-load time without enabling FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING or disabling DTD processing. When create(InputStream, EntryInserter) is invoked, the only feature set on the XMLReader is namespace support — external entity resolution and DOCTYPE declarations remain fully enabled. An attacker who can supply a crafted dictionary file (e.g., a stop-word list or domain dictionary) containing a malicious DOCTYPE declaration can trigger local file disclosure via file:// entity references or server-side request forgery via http:// entity references during SAX parsing, before the application processes a single dictionary entry. This is inconsistent with the project's own XmlUtil.createSaxParser() helper, which correctly sets FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING and disallow-doctype-decl and is used by all other XML parsing paths in the codebase. The public Dictionary(InputStream) constructor delegates directly to this method and is the documented API for loading user-supplied dictionaries, making untrusted input a realistic scenario. Mitigation: 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all dictionary files are sourced from trusted origins and should consider wrapping the Dictionary(InputStream) constructor with input validation that rejects any XML containing a DOCTYPE declaration before it reaches the parser.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- org.apache.opennlp:opennlp-tools
From 2.0 · fixed in 2.5.9; From 3.0.0-M1 · fixed in 3.0.0-M3; fixed in 1.9.5
- org.apache.opennlp:opennlp-toolsMaven
From 2.0.0 · fixed in 2.5.9
- org.apache.opennlp:opennlp-toolsMaven
From 3.0.0-M1 · fixed in 3.0.0-M3
- org.apache.opennlp:opennlp-toolsMaven
fixed in 1.9.5