When IMAP compression is enabled, the same compression state is reused across responses in a session, so response sizes depend on both attac
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.3.22.2, 3.0.7, 3.1.6, 2.4.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
When IMAP compression is enabled, the same compression state is reused across responses in a session, so response sizes depend on both attacker-supplied mail and other mail in the same mailbox. An attacker that can send mail to a user and can also observe the sizes of that user's IMAP traffic can confirm whether the body of a small message matches a guessed text. Recovery of arbitrary unknown content was not demonstrated, but the attack can disclose whether a secret-like message body matches a candidate. Disable IMAP compression. Update to non-vulnerable version. No publicly available exploits are known.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Open-Xchange GmbH OX Dovecot Pro
From 2.3.0 · fixed in 2.3.22.2; From 3.0.0 · fixed in 3.0.7; From 3.1.0 · fixed in 3.1.6
- Open-Xchange GmbH OX Dovecot CE
From 2.3.0 · fixed in 2.4.5